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I. Trends in Fertility 
During the 1950s, baby boom-fueled explosive 
population growth had been eating into the poor 
basis of economic growth, working as a major 
cause of the vicious cycle of poverty. Therefore, 
the Korean government adopted the anti-natal 
policy and initiated a strong family planning pro-
gram in the early 1960s when Korea’s economic 
development began to step up. As the family plan-
ning program began reaping its benefits and socio-
economic changes came into being, including the 
increase in the standard of livings in the wake of 
rapid economic growth and better and wider edu-
cation, the traditional value on high fertility began 
to wane. 
As a result, the total fertility rate (TFR) 
dropped sharply from 6.00 in 1960. The TFR 
already equal to the population replacement level 
in 1983, Thereafter, an phenomenon of low fertil-
ity under TFR of 2.1 has lasted in Korea. From the 
mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, the TFR with some 
irregularities maintained around 1.6 level. How-
ever, after this period Korea’s TFR declined rap-
idly as the country struggled through the financial 
crisis in 1997, below 1.2 in the 2000s (especially 
1.08 in 2005), the lowest in the world. The number 
of children per year was over 1 million during the 
period from 1960 to 1971 but decreased to below 
half a million since 2002. 
II. Causes of Fertility Change in Korea 
A. Demographic factors 
Demographically, fertility is determined by two 
factors, female’s age at first marriage (FAFM) and 
fertility rate of married women(marital fertility 
rate, MFR). The female’s age at first marriage was 
24.1 years in 1985 but soared-up to 28.1 years in 
2007, along with rise in rate of female enrollment 
in university (FUER) and female labor force partic-
ipation rate (FLPR). The rate of female enrollment 
in university increased from 31.3 percent in 1990 
to 83.8 percent in 2008. The female labor force 
participation rate increased from 47.0 percent in 
1990 to 50.1 percent in 2007 (42.6 to 68.0 percent 
for 25~29 age group and 49.5 to 53.6 percent for 
30~34 age group, which are in the main age span 
for first marriage and childbearing). Since most 
births still come from legally married couples in 
Korea (98.5 percent as of 2007), the prolonging of 
age at first marriage has played a role in decreas-
ing fertility level through curtailing the childbear-
ing span and increasing infertility. 
The marital fertility rate shows a decreasing 
trend in most age groups with some recent excep-
tions at older age groups. For example, the MFR 
of age 20~24 continued to decrease from 460 
per thousand married women in 1970 to 259 in 
2004. The MFR of 25~29 was 362 in 1970, which 
decreased up to the mid-1980s. MFR, with a short-
period increase, again turned to decrease since the 
Figure 1. Trends in Number of Live Births and TFR, 1970-2007
The Japanese Journal of Population, Vol.7, No.1 (March 2009)
58 59
then mid-1990s, reaching 193 in 2004. The MFR 
are age 30~34 decreased from 217 at age 30~34 
in 1970 but turned to increase since the mid-1980, 
reaching 99 in 2004. Such an age pattern of change 
in MFR was attributal to increase in age at first 
birth and thereby age at births.      
The influence of female’s age at first marriage 
and marital fertility rate on TFR has been different 
Figure 2. Trends in Female Labor Participation Rate(FLPR), Female University Enrollment 
Rate (FURE) and Female Age at First Marriage (FAFM) in Korea 
Figure 3. Trends in TFR and Age at First Marriage for Female (AFMF) in Korea 
Source : Korea National Statistical Office, KOSIS 
Table 1. Change in Marital Fertility Rate in Korea
Source: KNSO, Causes of Decrease in Number of Births, 2005.  
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by period, Until 1980s the decrease in marital fer-
tility rate was responsible for the rapid decrease 
in TFR. The TFR decline during the 1990s was 
caused mainly by the increase in female’s age 
at first marriage rather than decrease in marital 
fertility rate. However, the rapid decline in TFR 
during the period of 1999~2004 was attributal 
to both increase of female’s age at first marriage 
and decrease of marital fertility rate, to the almost 
similar extent. 
B. Socio-cultural and economic factors 
Changes in socio-economic circumstances and 
attitudes on family and child have had an inter-
active effect on the above demographic factors, 
and then fertility in Korea. Low fertility rates take 
place not only for financial reasons but also for 
socio-cultural reasons, such as deferred marriage 
and childbearing, of younger generations from 
individualistic motives (Freedman, 1995). As 
economic development makes people better off, 
stabilizationism and individualism dominate their 
values and young unmarried people rush to con-
sume, deferring marriage and childbearing which 
lead to low fertility rates (Lesthage et al., 1988). 
Younger generations tend to go to work stably 
from their parents’ home, depend on their mothers 
in their daily lives, and enjoy consumption. This 
trend increases some kind of aristocratic or para-
site singles who do not assume the responsibility 
to support the family, resulting in lower fertility 
rates (Atoh, 1998).
There has been a considerable change in val-
ues on marriage and child in Korean society; mar-
riage and childbirth are not longer universal values 
as duties but become a choice. In a 1998 survey by 
the National Statistical Office, Korea, the ratio of 
unmarried women polled on the value that people 
should get married accounted for a very low 20.3 
percent with total affirmative responses to mar-
riage, including those who said it is better to get 
married, being 63.3 percent. According to the 
2005 National Survey on Marriage and Fertility 
Dynamics, 28.6 percent of unmarried men and 
50.8 percent of unmarried women have a negative 
attitude on marriage (KIHASA, 2005). Only one 
fourth of the women expressed that they must have 
children. 
Married women’s views on children have also 
changed considerably. The ratio of those respon-
dents who answered that people should have chil-
dren was 40.5% in 1991. The ratio decreased to 
the 16.2% in 2000 and further fell as low as 10.2 
in 2006. People’s expectation of their children’s 
utility in the past was mostly a means of secur-
ing the family labor force, a source of security in 
retirement, and a succession of the family line. As 
social security has developed and consciousness on 
blood relationships has weakened, more emphasis 
has been placed on children’s values as agents of 
Table 2. Contribution of Female Age At First Marriage and Marital fertility Rate on TFR Decline 
Source: Lee, et al, Causes of Low Fertility and Comprehensive Policy Responses, Presidential Committee on Ageing Society 
and Population Policy, Ministry of Health and Welfare, KIHASA, 2006a. 
Source: Lee. et al, 2005 National Survey on Marriage and Fertility Dynamics, Presidential Committee on Ageing Society 
and Population Policy, Ministry of Health and Welfare, KIHASA, 2006b. 
Table 3. Unmarried People’s Attitude on Marriage, 2005 
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emotional dependence and support. The changes 
in the values on the qualitative utility of children 
have affected the quantitative value of their num-
bers, helping to firmly establish people’s views 
favoring a small number of children in Korea. 
Socio-economic and individual factors that 
have had a negative influence on fertility, include 
increase in uncertainty for the future due to high 
unemployment among young population, unstable 
job security, increasing economical burden of 
child-rearing including costs for private education 
of children, incompatibility between works and 
home, lack of infrastructure for child-care, aggra-
vation of reproductive health, etc. These factors 
have also interactive impact on people’s attitudes 
on marriage and child. 
In a broader view, unstable employment and 
slow business, have been known to be the causes 
of low fertility rates. Age at first marriage sharply 
rose and fertility rate dived in Korea after it was hit 
hard by the financial crisis in 1997, an indication 
that a sluggish economy, increased unemploy-
ment, and job insecurity are contributing factors to 
lowered fertility rates. According to 2005 National 
Survey on Marriage and Fertility Dynamics, main 
reasons for delaying marriage and childbirth 
appeared to be individual’s unemployment and 
unstable status of employment.  
An increase in educational expenses also 
helps lower fertility rates. Because of the exorbi-
tant costs of education from preschool to college, 
parents often put priority on quality rather than 
quantity and prefer fewer children or no children 
at all. According to 2005 National Survey on Mar-
riage and Fertility Dynamics, 9.9 percent of the 
women at age 20~39 ceased their childbirth with 
1 child due to burden of childrearing cost and 18.2 
percent due to burden of educational cost (those 
with 2 children were 11.9 percent and 23.8 per-
cent, respectively). This is partly because children 
Table 5. Costs for Childcare and Education, Imposing on Household 
Note: 1) the criterion is the monthly average income(3,073,029 Korean won) of the nuclear family as of 2003, provided by 
KNSO. 
 2) ( ) denotes percentage of cost for childrearing and education to the total income. 
Source: KIHASA, National Fertility and Family Health Survey, Each year. 
Table 4. Married Women’s Attitude on Children 
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are no longer taken as an investment for their 
parents’ old age security, and raising them is now 
regarded as an opportunity cost for the time and 
income of the couples, especially for the women. 
Such burden of child-rearing was also associated 
with unstability of income and housing.  
In Korea, women have increasingly partici-
pated in economic activities; The economic par-
ticipation rate of women at age 25-29 increased 
from 47.9 percent in 1995 to 72.7 percent in 2007 
and 47.6 percent to 73.2 percent for the women 
of 30-34. However, in Korea social circumstances 
and infra have been not well established in favor 
of women’s compatibility between work and home 
including childcare. Grant of maternity leave and 
childcare leave were poor in sustaining household 
expenditures. Above all, the social-cultural atmo-
sphere such as family-friendly employment and 
gender-equal family were not well fostered. For 
example, working mothers spent 197 minutes on 
house chores and childcare but her husbands spent 
only 72 minutes, on average, in a working day (Lee 
et al., 2006b). Childcare services and facilities 
were inappropriate for various demands of work-
ing mothers, in both sides of quantity and quality. 
For example, the provision of childcare facilities 
met only 30 percent of demand as of 2005(Lee 
et al., 2006b).  Culturally, Korean men’s roles in 
housework remains more or less the same as in 
the past, characterized by patriarchism. As balanc-
ing housework and economic activities emerges as 
a greater challenge to women, they tend to have 
children as late, and fewer, as possible and some 
even do not want any at all. Eventually, women 
have to choose one between job and housework, in 
Korean society. According to 2005 National Sur-
vey on Marriage and Fertility Dynamics, 60.6 per-
cent of the working women was out of work due to 
marriage and 49.8 percent due to first childbirth. 
One thing that distinguishes Korea from such 
Western countries as France and Sweden is that in 
Korea premarital childbirth is strongly suppressed 
both socially and individually. The socio-bio gap 
between the age at marriage and sexual activities 
has increased the number of premarital pregnan-
cies. However, in Korea where ceremonial mar-
riage is established as a strong social norm and 
extramarital childbearing is not socially accepted, 
most such pregnancies end up being compulsorily 
aborted for reasons of society’s cold treatment and 
criticism. According to a 2005 survey (Ministry of 
Health and Welfare), 42 percent of some 350,000 
induced abortions that take place annually are 
carried out on unmarried pregnant women. This 
shows that Korea’s fertility rates are more directly 
affected by nuptiality; an increase of age at mar-
riage leads to a decrease in fertility rates. 
III. Policy Response to Low Fertility in Korea 
A. Shift of population policy 
In Korea, the national family planning program, as 
a major means of population control policy, was 
adopted in 1962. This program includes the demo-
graphic target of reducing the annual population 
growth rate and the total fertility rate, and it was 
vigorously implemented as a categorical program 
through the successive five-year economic devel-
opment plans. The strength of family planning 
program lied in its limited goals, the acquisition 
of resources and the building of an organizational 
process specifically for the demographic goals. 
Also, commitment to family planning goals led 
to development of extensive linkages with other 
sectors such as the mass media, and private practi-
tioners’ clinics and hospitals. 
As a result of these efforts by the government 
in increasing population control programs, fertil-
ity took a drastic downturn in the 1980s. In 1988 
the national family planning program in Korea 
achieved its primary objectives of reducing the 
Source: Ministry of Labor(2008), 2007 Yearly Statistics of Employment Insurance 
Table 6. Number of Childcare Leave 
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fertility rate to below the replacement level and 
accomplishing near universal contraceptive use. 
As a result, since the late 1980s the government 
began to move away from its policy on free contra-
ceptive distribution through government programs 
toward a self-paid system, administered by private 
and commercial sectors, such as the nationwide 
health insurance program. 
Nevertheless, no sooner was one set of prob-
lems overcome than new challenges of a totally 
different nature arose out of the resulting decreased 
fertility rate. Some of the unfavorable conse-
quences of rapid fertility decline in Korea include 
an unbalanced sex ratio, an increase in the elderly 
population, and a high prevalence of selective 
abortions. In order to deal with these new prob-
lems, it became apparent that Korea would have to 
shift its population policy directions in a way that 
best reflected the changing socio-economic and 
demographic conditions currently being witnessed 
and forecast for the immediate future. 
For this purpose, the government established 
a Population Policy Deliberation Committee in 
December 1994 to review population policy by 
focusing on its past accomplishments and future 
prospects, as well as related socio-economic prob-
lems, in an effort to work out new policy direc-
tions and measures for the 21st century. In 1996, 
the government officially adopted new population 
policy with emphasis on reproductive health care 
services. 
As the fertility rate has, however, continued 
to decrease, a Committee on Ageing and Future 
Society (CAFS) was established to prepare policies 
and programs for pro-natality and preparations for 
the coming aged society in 2003. The Basic Law 
on Low Fertility and Aged Society was promul-
gated in May 2005. In June 2006, the Presidential 
Committee on Ageing Society and Population 
Policy, upgraded from by CAFS, promulgated the 
First Basic Planning for Low Fertility and Aged 
Society(2006-2010). 
Table 7. Policy Measures for Fostering Environments favorable of Childbirth and Childcare in 
Response to Low Fertility: strengthening responsibility of society for child-birth and 
child-rearing 
1-1. attenuating socio-
economic burden 
of childcare for 
family with chil-
dren
1) extending supports for 
costs of child care and  
pre-school education
•	support	for	daycare	and	pre-school	education	for	
0-4 years old children (subsidy)
•	support	for	free	daycare	and	pre-school	education	
for 4 years old children (free of charge) 
•	support	for	daycare	and	education	for	the	family	
with two children or more
2) expanding the after-school 
education to attenuate 
the economical burden of 
households
•	improvement	of	after-school	education	system	
and support for the low income class
•	provision	of	voucher	for	low	income	class
•	expansion	of	primary	daycare
•	integration	of	after-school	daycare	and	education
•	improvement	of	cyber	home	education
3) expansion of tax and social 
insurance benefit for the 
family with many children
•	revision	of	taxation	system	in	favor	of	the	family	
with many children
•	revision	of	assessment	system	for	health	insurance	
fee 
•	introduction	of	credit	system	in	national	pension
4) providing various  
incentives for families  
with children
•	support	for	stability	of	housing	for	families	with	
children
•	providing	priority	to	use	of	daycare	facilities		for	
families with children
5) reinforcing supports for  
the adoption family
•	improvement	for	perception	on	adoption
•	strengthening	support	for	adopting	families
•	support	for	fees	of	adoption
•	support	for	free	daycare	and	pre-school	education
•	introduction	of	adoption	allowance
•	increase	in	subsidy	and	medical	cost	for	the	adopt-
ers of disabled children
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B. Policy Responses to Low Fertility 
The First Basic Plan for Low Fertility and Aged 
Society (2006-2010), which was set-up in 2006, 
aims to foster environments in favor of child-
rearing, to establish the base for improving quality 
of life in the aged society, and to secure power for 
economic growth in low fertility and aged society. 
The First Plan will be followed by the Second Plan 
(2011-2015) with the aim of steady recovery of 
fertility rate and consolidation of the social system 
for the aged society, and then by the Third Plan 
(2016-2020) with the aim of increase of fertility 
rate to the average level of OECD countries and 
successful adaption for the aged society.  
In efforts at fostering environments appropri-
ate for child-rearing, the Plan adopts strengthening 
responsibility of society for child-birth and child-
rearing, fostering the family-friendly and gender-
equal socio-culture, and raising future generation 
wholesomely.
Firstly, responsibility of society for child-birth 
and child-rearing will be strengthened by the fol-
lowing measures; 1) extending supports for costs 
of child care and education, and expanding the 
after-school education to attenuate the economi-
cal burden of households; 2) providing various 
incentives for families with children; reinforc-
ing supports for the adoption family; expanding 
public and workplace childcare facilities, improv-
ing quality of service in the private child-care 
facilities, and extending child-care service to meet 
diversified demands; 3) establishing the health and 
nutrition system for maternity and children, pro-
viding economical support for couples suffering 
from infertility and aids for postpartum care and 
new-born infants of the poor class. 
1-2. expanding  
childcare infra, 
with diversity and 
good quality
1) expanding public and 
workplace childcare  
facilities
•	expansion	of	public	childcare	facilities
•	establishment	of	and	support	for	integrated	day-
care facilities
•	expansion	of	workplace	childcare	facilities
2) improving quality of  
service in the private  
child-care facilities
•	support	for	improvements	of	private	child-care	
facilities’s services
•	enforcement	of	evaluation	certification	for	child-
care facilities
3) extending child-care 
service to meet diversified 
demands
•	expansion	of	prolonged	daycare	services
•	expansion	of	all-day	nursery	school
•	support	of	helpers	for	parttime	daycare	facilities
•	establishment	of	and	support	for	daycare	facilities	
within cultural facilities
1-3. expansion of  
support for  
pregnancy and 
childbirth
1) establishing the health and 
nutrition system for  
maternity and children
•	establishment	of	professional	centers	for	health	of	
maternity and infant
•	establishment	of	basis	for	systematic	health	man-
agement of new born babies
•	provision	of	credible	information	and	counselling	
services for childbirth and childcare
•	support	for	reproductive	health	program
•	expansion	national	prerequisite	vaccination
•	expansion	of	support	for	health	diagnosis	and	
nutritional management for maternity and infants
•	nutrition-supplementary	management	for	mater-
nity and infants
•	expansion	of	support	for	breast-feeding
•	protection	of	maternity	from	inadequate	induced	
abortion 
2) providing economical  
support for couples  
suffering from infertility
•	support	for	costs	of	test-tube	baby
3) aids for postpartum care 
and new-born infants of the 
poor class
•	provision	of	helper	service	for	maternity	protec-
tion
Source: Korean Government, The First Basic Planning for Low Fertility and Aged Society(2006-2010), 2006. 
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Secondly, fostering of the family-friendly and 
gender-equal socio-culture is to be achieved by 
the following measures; 1) increasing compatibil-
ity between works and home through expanding 
government’s supports for maternity leave grant, 
support for the women’s return to the labor market 
after their childcare, diversification of childcare 
leave, flexibility of labor conditions, and aids for 
the family-friendly establishments; 2) formulating 
gender-equal family and social culture by educa-
tional programs at both school and society, and 
intensified publicity; and strengthening the ties 
between the family members through supports 
for family leisures and culture, and provision of 
educational program for family life. 
Thirdly, raising future generation healthy 
is to be realized through providing children and 
youths with safe environments, and observing 
children’s rights. 
IV. Policy Responses and Recent Fertility Trends 
Although public concerns started since 2002 and 
some policy measures were enforced in 2003 to 
2005, it is the only the mid-2006 in Korea when 
the comprehensive policy response in an omnidi-
rectional way with a name of the First Basic Plan 
for Low Fertility and Aged Society started, There-
fore, it needs some more times for its authentic 
evaluation. 
However, it is notable that the number of chil-
dren increased for the first time since 1994 from 438 
thousands in 2005 to 452 thousands in 2006 and 
497 thousands in 2007, increasing TFR from 1.08 
in 2005 to 1.13 in 2006 and 1.26 in 2007. The only 
exception was in 2000, when the number of births 
increased, due to new millenium baby-boom. 
From such a short-period result, it may be too 
early to note that the Korean fertility reached its 
lowest point in 2005 and thereafter turned toward 
Table 8. Policy Measures for Fostering Environments favorable of Childbirth and Childcare in 
Response to Low Fertility:  fostering of the family-friendly and gender-equal socio-culture 
2-1. increasing  
compatibility 
between works 
and home. 
1) expanding government’s 
supports for maternity 
leave grant
•	support	for	small-medium	establishments	in	pay-
ing grants 
•	providing	grants	for	abortion	and	stillbirth	leave
•	introducing	partner’s	childbirth	nursery	leave	
2) diversification of childcare 
leave and flexibility of 
labor conditions
•	activation	of	childcare	leave
•	introduction	of	curtailed	labor	hours	during	child-
care period 
•	increasing	flexibility	of	working	pattern
3) support the women’s return 
to the labor market after 
their childcare
•	expansion	of	support	for	subsidy	for	women’s	
return to work after childbirth
•	support	for	subsidy	for	continuing	employment	of	
the temporary workers after their childbirth
•	operating	programs	of	housewives’	return	to	labor	
market
•	operating	manpower	bank	of	women	with	career	
stopped
4) support for the family-
friendly establishments
•	development	of	model	for	operating	family-
friendly enterprisers
•	support	for	family-friendly	enterprisers	such	as	
providing enterprisers’ certificate 
•	development	and	spread	of	family-friendly	educa-
tion programs
2-2. formulating 
gender-equal 
family and social 
culture
1) strengthening school and 
society educations and 
intensified publicity in 
lifetime
•	school	and	society	educations	and	intensified	
publicity in lifetime
2) strengthening the ties be-
tween the family members
•	provision	of	educational	program	and	family	
counselling for family life
•	supports	for	family	leisures	and	culture
•	accommodating	family-friendly	community	envi-
ronment 
Source: Korean Government, The First Basic Planning for Low Fertility and Aged Society(2006-2010), 2006.
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an increasing trend. However, such an increase is 
worth to be analyzed for future efforts to overcome 
the lowest fertility trends in the Korean context. 
The main factors to be considered include change 
in demographic features such as age structure 
of women in childbearing period, and impact of 
socio-economic changes such as economic cycle, 
policy implementation, public concerns and atmo-
spheres, etc.
A. Demographic effect 
The recent increase in number of live births turned 
out to be attributal to change in fertility rather than 
in age structure of women in childbearing period. 
The rise in fertility accounted for 141.5 percent 
of increase in number of live births in 2006 com-
pared to 2005, meanwhile change in age structure 
of women in childbearing period played a nega-
tive role to decrease the number of live births. The 
same result came true even in 2007, the fertility 
increase accounting for 114.5 percent of increase 
in live births. The difference between 2006 and 
2007 was that the negative effect of the age struc-
ture change decreased to some extent. 
However, contributions of two demographic 
factors to recent increase in fertility level among age 
groups of women in childbearing period. For 20-24 
age group, both fertility and number of women 
decreased, having a negative impact on overall 
fertility level, between the period 2005 and 2006. 
However, its fertility rose to increase in number of 
live births, even if there was a decrease in number 
of women in that age group. For 25-29 age group, 
number of women increased but fertility decreased 
in 2006, contributing negatively to overall fertility 
level. In 2007, its fertility and number of women 
in that age group increased, leading the increase 
in number of live births. For 30-34 age group, the 
number of women decreased but fertility increased 
to a greater extent in 2006 and 2007, having posi-
tive effects on overall fertility level. For 35-39 age 
group, number of women and fertility increased in 
2006 and 2007, making the number of live births 
in this age group increase. A greater contribution 
was made by increase in the magnitude of women 
in age group of 25-29; due to ‘post-baby boom-
ers’ who were born in the period between 1979 and 
1982 and whose marriages has recently increased, 
Figure 4. Contribution of change in fertility and women’s age structure to 
2006-2007 increase in number of live births 
Figure 5. Trends in number of live births born between 1974-1985 
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as seen in Figure 4 and Figure 5. 
Thus, the number of first marriage from 
women under 35 years old increased from 236 
thousands in 2004 to 259 thousands in 2006 and 
268 thousands in 2007. It was due mainly to the 
entry of post-babyboomers into marriageable ages 
and the increase of the delayed marriages. The lat-
ter may be coincident with increase in age-specific 
marriage rate in recent years. 
B. Economic effect 
In general, there is a positive relationship between 
economic cycle and fertility rat: as economic 
conditions improve, employment rate and income 
level increase and thereafter marriage and fertility 
rate increase, and vice versa. It might be noted that 
in Korea the recent increase in TFR (empirically 
for the years of 2006 and 2007) was attributable 
to economic recovery accompanied by rise in 
employment rate since 2003. Despite economic 
recovery since 2003, fertility rate increased form 
2006. Such a 3-year time-lag could occur for 
change in attitudes, making-decision for marriage 
or childbirth, and pregnancy after change in eco-
nomic situation. 
C. Effect of policy responses 
It is really difficult to measure the effect of poli-
cies on fertility change, specifically after short 
term of their implementation, since many factors 
including policy have intermingled effect on fertil-
ity. Nonetheless, an analysis was done to monitor 
the operation of various policy measures in Korea. 
In Table 9, we can see a greater jump of output 
from policy responses since launching of policy 
response in 2006. 
KIHASA in collaboration with Ministry 
of Health, Welfare and Family conducted  2006 
Figure 7. Increase rate in first marriages of women under 35 years old 
Figure 6. Trends in first marriages of 1979-1982 cohorts
Source: KNSO. 
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Figure 8. Real GDP Growth Rate and TFR, 1970-2006 
Table 9. Some outputs of recent policy responses 
Source: Korean Government 
National Fertility Dynamics Survey in 2007 and 
2007 National Fertility Dynamics Survey in 2007, 
respectively. A logistic model was applied to 
the result of the 2007 National Fertility Dynam-
ics Survey. As a result, policies that had positive 
effect, with statistical significance at p<0.001, 
on transference from the 1st birth to 2nd birth 
appeared to be policy for establishing the health 
and nutrition system for maternity and children, 
policy for increasing compatibility between works 
and home, support policy for costs of child care 
and pre-school education, in that order. The poli-
cies having a positive effect on transference from 
the 2nd birth to 3rd birth include support for costs 
of child care and pre-school education, policy for 
raising compatibility between works and home, 
policy for establishing the health and nutrition 
system for maternity and children, in that order 
.policies that had positive effect, with statistical 
significance at p<0.001, on appeared to be policy 
for establishing the health and nutrition system 
for maternity and children, policy for increasing 
compatibility between works and home, support 
policy for costs of child care and pre-school edu-
cation, in that order. 
Reference group: mother’s age (>35), moth-
er’s educational attainment ((high school or less), 
household income (100% or higher than average 
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level), economical activity (unemployed), eco-
nomical status (unpaid workers) 
V. Concluding Remarks 
It may be concluded that increase in fertility level 
in recent years seemed to be attributable to change 
in demographic factors (mainly increase in num-
ber of women in childbearing age and marriages, 
especially for 25-29 age group), economic recov-
ery, and policy responses, with interactive effect. 
From such a result, several scenarios or expecta-
tions can be made. 
Firstly, it can be expected that if some demo-
graphic factors favorable to the recent increase in 
fertility wane, Korean fertility level will decrease 
again or be stable at the same level in the future.    
Secondly, if the economic recovery helped 
increase marriages and fertility level, the world-
wide financial crisis in 2008 may be expected to 
discourage marriage and childbirth in the future. 
Thirdly, the effect of policy responses may 
be temporary since the policy response coincided 
with the other factors in favor. However, the effect 
of policy response may be diminished if the mea-
sures cannot overcome their inherited weakness.    
It may be worth to put a more emphasis on 
policy efforts to increase the fertility rate to the 
sustainable level in the near future, since the 
demographic structure such as decrease in num-
ber of women in childbearing period, economic 
situation, etc. can be aggravated in the future. 
Some suggestion for future improvement in policy 
Table 10. Effect of policy responses for 2007: logistic regression 
Note:  p<0.05,  0.01<p<0.05,  0.01<p<0.001 
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response to low fertility are as followings; 
1) Most of support for daycare, education, 
healthcare, etc. are too confined to low 
income class. It needs to expand the pro-
grams to all lasses as early as possible. 
2) It needs to increase the number of items and 
benefits, covered by Health Insurance Sys-
tem, since the medical costs for both preven-
tive and curative purposes are too expensive 
for the families, especially with many chil-
dren. It also needs to extend the benefits of 
certain insurance items to the older children 
such as high school students. 
3) It needs to increase benefits of childcare 
leave to replace wage for the life of fam-
ily. This will play a very important role in 
activating childcare leave system to increase 
compatibility between work and home.   
4) Currently, the government’s support is to 
cover a part of cost for daycare and medical 
care, which is covered by Health Insurance 
System. And most of the support tends to be 
confined to the low income class. In Korea, 
the cost of layette including clothing and 
food is expensive, from which the family 
with children suffer. In order to practically 
attenuate the family’s burden for childcare, 
it needs to introduce the child allowance and 
education allowance, which covers all chil-
dren under certain age, regardless of order of 
birth and without mean tests. Those allow-
ances will help the families to rear their chil-
dren in a better condition and will thereby 
help the fertility level to increase. The educa-
tion allowance needs to be operated until the 
public education being realized. 
4) An emphasis on men’s obligations to house-
work will make it easier for women to bal-
ance child-rearing and work, positively 
working on having children. On the other 
hand, enhanced gender equality will help 
more women to take part in economic activi-
ties and have fewer children than in the past. 
5) Although the lowest fertility was greatly 
attributable to postponement and giving-up 
of marriage, the policy measures for raising 
the marriage rate were not included in the 
First Basic Plan, Currently, some local gov-
ernments and private organizations devoted 
themselves to providing unmarried people 
with information and mediation to increase 
opportunities for marriage. The postpone-
ment and giving-up of marriage has been 
strongly associated with economic situa-
tions and change in values on marriage and 
childbirth. Therefore, it needs to provide the 
youth with employment opportunities with 
stable status as well as to put an emphasis 
on values in favor of marriage and children 
from their early ages under school and social 
education system. In addition, policy mea-
sures, rather systematical and effective, for 
encouraging and facilitating marriages need 
to be designed to enable the single males and 
females to marry at the time they desire to.  
5) In order to avoid duplicity and maximize 
effectiveness, all responses need to be 
designed in an integrated manner which can 
bring the synergy effects, in making circum-
stances favorable to child care and increasing 
the fertility level. 
6) It needs to increase investments for the future 
generations. Currently, Korea   Government 
plans to spend 19 trillion won, which is 
quite lower than those of OECD countries. 
Enlightenment and appeal with small invest-
ment would have limitations to achieve the 
reasonable fertility level for the future.  
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